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This paper presents evidence on the labor market effects of social assistance programs 
in the short and medium run. We evaluate the impact of a Conditional Cash Transfer 
—cct— program “Familias en Accion” on informality at the individual level in Colombia. 
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workers’ propensity to participate in the informal labor market in Colombia, both one and 
four years after the program’s implementation. To overcome the problem of unobserved 
time-invariant differences, our empirical strategy includes a combination of matching 
algorithms and difference-in-differences methodology. Our results show that worker’s 
informality condition may be affected by receiving cct income.
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Asistencia social e informalidad: analizando  
la relación en Colombia
Resumen
Este trabajo presenta evidencia sobre los efectos de los programas de asistencia social en 
el mercado laboral, tanto en el corto como en el mediano plazo. Evaluamos el impacto del 
programa de transferencias monetarias condicionadas “Familias en Acción” sobre la infor-
malidad en Colombia a nivel individuo. Además, se realiza la evaluación utilizando tres 
perspectivas diferentes del concepto de “informalidad” que capturan diversas facetas del 
problema. Argumentamos que, a pesar de que no es un resultado deseable, ser beneficiario 
de programas de protección social podría crear incentivos perversos como la informalidad. 
Para alcanzar nuestro objetivo, utilizamos datos de la encuesta del programa “Familias en 
Acción” para identificar si el programa tiene algún efecto en la propensión de los trabajado-
res a participar en el mercado de trabajo informal en Colombia, uno y cuatro años después 
de la implementación del mismo. Nuestra estrategia empírica incluye una combinación de 
algoritmos de pareo, además de la metodología de diferencias en diferencias. Nuestros 
resultados muestran que la condición de informalidad de los trabajadores sí puede verse 
afectada en caso de recibir una transferencia monetaria condicionada.
Palabras clave: informalidad, transferencias monetarias condicionadas.
Clasificación jel: E26, C14, H43
Assistência social e informalidade: analisando  
a relação na Colômbia
Resumo
Este trabalho apresenta evidencia sobre os efeitos dos programas de assistência social no 
mercado laboral tanto no curto quanto no mediano prazo. Avaliamos o impacto do pro-
grama de transferências monetárias condicionadas “Família em Ação” sobre a informali-
dade na Colômbia no nível indivíduo. Além disso, se realiza a avaliação utilizando três 
perspectivas diferentes do conceito de “informalidade” que capturam diversas facetas do 
problema. Argumentamos que a pesar de que não é um resultado desejável, ser beneficiário 
de programas de proteção social poderia criar incentivos perversos como a informalidade. 
Para conseguir o nosso objetivo, utilizamos dados do inquérito do programa “Famílias em 
Ação” para identificar se o programa tem algum efeito na propensão dos trabalhadores 
a participar no mercado de trabalho informal na Colômbia, um e quatro anos depois da 
implementação do mesmo. Nossa estratégia empírica inclui uma combinação de algorit-
mos de emparelhamento para além da metodologia de diferenças em diferenças. Nossos 
resultados mostram que a condição de informalidade dos trabalhadores sim pode se ver 
afetada no caso de receber uma transferência monetária condicionada.
Palavras-chave: informalidade, transferências monetárias condicionadas.
Classificação jel: E26, C14, H43
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Introduction
The effects of conditional cash transfers —ccts— have been widely studied, 
with a special focus on developing and middle income countries. Rawlings 
and Rubio (2003) and Fiszbein et al. (2009) provide a wide review of ccts’ 
effects over different outcomes, such as poverty, education and health. Latin 
America is recognized as the starting point of cct programs with Mexico’s 
Progresa in 1997 (later called Oportunidades), which was subsequently used 
as a model to expand ccts to countries such as Brazil with “Bolsa Escola” and 
“Bolsa Familia”, Peru with “Juntos” and Colombia with “Familias en Accion”.
Although the effects of the cct programs over different outcomes have been 
widely analyzed, there is still mixed evidence regarding the effects of ccts 
on labor supply decisions and specifically in informality. Some studies report 
findings with different magnitudes (Fiszbein et al., 2009; Levy, 2008; Gasparini, 
Haimovich & Olivieri, 2009; Camacho, Conover & Hoyos, 2013), and others do 
not even find significant evidence (Filmer & Schady, 2014 Urdinola, Haimov-
ich & Robayo, 2009; Edmonds & Schady, 2008; Skoufias & Di Maro, 2006).
The concern about this topic generally focuses on the eligibility criteria of 
ccts that may generate perverse incentives for cct programs’ beneficiaries 
to move out of the labor force or towards informality. While the eligibility 
criteria of a cct program may not explicitly rule out people working in the 
formal sector, being a beneficiary from “Familias en Accion” may increase 
the probability to move towards the informal sector, since having a job in the 
formal sector increases individual income, reducing the probability of being 
eligible to be a beneficiary of the program. Our hypothesis is that benefits 
from social protection programs make individuals likely to maintain the 
features that benefit them and make them selectable for social benefits, such 
as a “registered” low income or being non-salaried (informal employment).
To test our hypothesis, we use evaluation data of the Colombian social 
assistance program “Familias en Accion”. This dataset contains information 
at the household and individual levels of beneficiaries before the execution 
of the program and for one and four years after its implementation. Regard-
ing our empirical strategy, to overcome the problem of unobserved time-
invariant differences, we applied a combination of matching algorithms 
and difference-in-differences techniques. Our results show that a worker’s 
informality condition may be affected by receiving cct income.
We attempt to contribute to the existing literature to design more appro-
priate cct policies, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean. Therefore, 
this research has three distinctive features. First, given that the previous 
conclusions are mixed, we test our hypothesis by including three different 
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perspectives of informality to achieve more conclusive results. Second, we 
use a very complete dataset from the Familias en Accion program that allows 
us to confidently apply quasi-experimental techniques to precisely determine 
the effects of social programs over the propensity towards informality. Third, 
our dataset allows us to compare the effects of a cct program over time (the 
short and medium run).
This first section of the article provides a brief overview of the article. A 
review of the “Familias en Accion” program is presented in section two, and 
section three assesses the different definitions of informality and its relation-
ship with social protection and conditional cash transfer programs. In section 
four, we describe the characteristics of our data, characterize our sample and 
develop our main assumptions. Section five describes the methodologies 
used to accomplish the impact evaluation and the results of the estimation. 
Finally, in section six, we discuss the results and provide some conclusions.
1. Familias en Accion
Familias en Accion is a social protection program in the form of a cct. It has 
been applied by the Colombian government as part of the Social Support 
Network, “Red de Protección Social —rps—”, since 2001, with financial sup-
port from the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank. rps is 
a public temporary social safety net that was created in 1999, with the aim of 
alleviating the effects of an economic recession and fiscal policy adjustments 
on extremely vulnerable populations in Colombia.
The Familias en Accion program was implemented only in municipali-
ties that met specific features, including having fewer than 100,000 inhabit-
ants, preferably when located in a rural area, having at least one financial 
institution, not being the capital of a regional district, having the essential 
infrastructure for health and education services, and not being located in the 
Coffee Region1 (ifs-Econometria, 2004). Within the selected municipalities 
(as detailed in Attanassio et al., 2006), of the 1,024 municipalities in Colom-
bia, 691 qualified for the program, another eligibility criterion for Familias 
en Accion beneficiaries is an instrument called System for Identification and 
Selection of Social Spending Beneficiaries (Sisben in Spanish).
1 The Coffee Region, in central Colombia, received special assistance as a conse-
quence of the 1995 earthquake.
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Sisben classifies households into six different categories according to 
the household living conditions and defines potential beneficiaries of social 
programs as those people who are ranked among the three first levels (poor 
population). Sisben has evolved over time,2 and the most important changes 
were focused on how to assess people’s living conditions. The first version of 
Sisben was active from 1995 until 2005 (the implementation period of Familias 
en Accion) and was estimated through the principal components statistical 
procedure. The groups of variables considered for the index’s construction 
were education, social security, demographics, income, house quality and 
equipment, and access to utilities (dnp, 2008).
Sisben uses the Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index and the Poverty Line as 
judgment standards to define its classification thresholds. Then, according to 
dnp (2008), an individual was considered poor if at least one basic need was 
unsatisfied and his income was 1.7 times below the poverty line. In a similar 
way, an individual was considered extremely poor if at least two basic needs 
were unsatisfied and his income was below the poverty line. These cut-points 
helped define the six different levels of the Sisben classification.
For a household to be enrolled by the National Planning Department 
—dnp— as a Familias en Accion grant recipient, it had to fulfill certain condi-
tions. First, the household had to have children aged between 0 and 17 years. 
Second, it had to be classified as Sisben-1, which means that it had to belong 
to the poorest part of the population. As special cases, households that had 
children aged between 0 and 17 years and had been internally displaced or 
indigenous could also be enrolled as Familias en Accion beneficiaries.
The primary objective of Familias en Accion is to safeguard and foster 
human capital formation among children aged 0 to 17 from poor or vulner-
able households through two different subsidies. The first subsidy is related 
to health and nutrition. It was provided to the beneficiary household on the 
conditions that children aged below 7 years were vaccinated and attended 
health and nutritional check-ups. In addition, mothers had to attend infor-
mational presentations on health, nutrition and contraception. The monthly 
cct provided was approximately US$ 17.45 (COP3 50,000) and was given per 
family, regardless of the number of children aged below 7 in the household.
The second subsidy is related to education and was provided to the ben-
eficiary household for every child between 7 and 17 years who was enrolled 
2 By 2017, there were three different versions of Sisben.
3 Central Bank of Colombia, trm (Market Representative Exchange Rate) COP 
2,864.79 per dollar at December 31st, 2002.
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in school and attended no less than 80 % of classes during the school year. 
As mentioned before, the monthly grant was given per child. In 2002, it was 
set at approximately US$ 5 (COP 14,000) for each primary school child and 
US$ 10 (COP 28,000) for each secondary school child.
In accordance with our Familias en Accion database, an average beneficiary 
household has six members,4 one of which is a child aged below 7, and two 
of which are children between 7 and 17 years. Given that the legal minimum 
wage for Colombia in 2002 was around US$ 107.8 (COP 309,000), the relevance 
of Familias en Accion grant is evident, since an average Familias en Accion 
beneficiary household would receive a grant of US$ 41.8 (COP 120,000) each 
month, which represents 38.8 % of a legal minimum wage.
To determine the impact of the program on children health and nutrition, 
an initial assessment was conducted in 2004, and a second one was conducted 
in 2006. The information collected contains data from beneficiary and non-
beneficiary households with similar characteristics, aiming to estimate the 
impact of the program through quasi-experimental techniques. According to 
official reports (ifs-Econometría, 2004; dnp, 2008), the general conclusion of 
both evaluations is that the program effectively achieved its objectives, as it 
increased public expenditures on education, positively affected growth pat-
terns among rural children and the weights of urban children, and reduced 
extreme poverty levels in rural areas, among others.5
2. Informality
The origins of informality can be understood from two perspectives. The 
“exclusion” perspective claims that informality is imposed on individuals 
because of labor market segmentation (Rauch, 1991; De Soto, 1989; Harris 
& Todaro, 1970). In contrast to this position, the “exit” perspective argues 
that informality might be the individual’s choice instead of an imposition 
(Hirschman, 1970; Hirschman, 1981). As Levy (2007) and Levy (2008) explain, 
informality could be a result of individual´s optimal labor supply decisions.
However, there are several ways that academics have used to study infor-
mality. The characteristics agreed upon by most definitions are that informal 
4 Rounded numbers based on the first following information with 15,110 individu-
als and 7,267 households as sample.
5 There are also studies that analyze the impact of fa on areas other than those for 
which the program was created, such as intra-household time allocation (Ospina, 2010) 
and voters’ behavior (Nupia, 2011).
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employment involves economic activities that are not officially regulated 
or registered, that have irregular work conditions, that are labor intensive, 
 where workers learn skills but those skills are usually not portable,6 and entry 
and exit are easier than they are in the formal sector (Bacchetta, Ekkerhard & 
Bustamante, 2009; Bernal, 2009; Maloney, 2004).
Given that it is almost impossible to capture all these perspectives in one 
single definition of informality, and the complexity and peculiarities of the 
Colombian labor market, we used three different definitions of informality 
using social security, productivity and legal criteria. Each one of these defini-
tions lets us understand informality from a distinct perspective and provide 
us with a wider view about informal employment.
From the social protection perspective, any worker who receives a pay-
ment for his/her job can be considered informal if he/she is not enrolled in 
social security by the hiring firm (Levy, 2008). However, not enrolling employ-
ees in social security is illegal.7 Firm owners occasionally directly negotiate 
with future employees to exchange their social security contributions for a 
higher salary or “under the table” bonuses. Thus, we are uncertain whether 
this illegal activity that implies a lack of social security benefits is voluntary 
or compulsory.
From a productivity perspective, we consider Gasparini and Tornarolli’s 
(2007) standpoint that argues that informal workers display low productivity, 
which means they are unskilled and work at marginal jobs. Additionally, the 
International Labor Organization —ilo— characterizes the informal sector as 
primarily labor intensive, with a high requirement of low-level skills, and in 
which workers usually gain their skills at work. To approximate something as 
abstract as “productivity” or to represent the “lack of skills” with information 
contained in surveys, we follow Gasparini and Tornarolli (2007) and use the 
workers’ education level as a proxy. Therefore, any independent worker, farm 
boss or day laborer that receives a payment for his work that also has a low 
educational level (less than high school graduate) can be considered informal.
From a legal perspective, we will take advantage of some distinct legal 
attributes of the Colombian health system. According to Law 100 passed 
on December 23, 1993, all Colombian residents must be affiliated with the 
General System of Health Services. Thus, individuals who have a formal job 
(workers) must be enrolled by their employers in the contributive health 
6 As Bacchetta et al. (2009) mentions, these skills are accepted only by a limited 
number of firms or might not be recognized at all by future employers.
7 Levy (2008) states that hiring salaried workers but not enrolling them in social 
security is an illegal act committed by the firm and not by the worker.
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system, and individuals who lack employment contracts must be enrolled by 
the  government in the subsidized health system. Therefore, we assume that 
any worker that is enrolled in the Colombian contributive health system is 
considered formal, while when workers are enrolled in the subsidized health 
system it implies that they do not have an employment and are considered 
as informal.
To analyze the effects of ccts on informality using the previously men-
tioned definitions, we followed Levy’s (2008) approach, which argues that 
informality is a result of individual’s valuation of social programs. This valua-
tion is influenced by the alternatives that the economic agent has costs and 
quality of the alternatives and by the ability to remove from the “package of 
benefits” those benefits they do not want to consume. It has to be clear that 
the individual’s valuation is independent from the design and quality of 
the institutions and programs that implement social protection. Moreover, 
workers’ decisions reflect their utility maximization, given the opportunities 
and incentives they have with each alternative, independently of the social 
program’s design.
We adapt Levy’s (2008) valuation scheme to a non-salaried worker’s uti-
lity. We denote Ci as the cost per worker of social protection programs, and 
βi as the worker’s valuation of social protection programs. Then, the utility a 
worker obtains from working in the informal sector (U) is the sum of his/her 
wage (informal_Wage) plus the value he/she gives to social protection (βi Ci):
U= informal_Wage + βi Ci
It is worth mentioning that informal_Wage is low because, in order to 
receive social protection programs benefits (classify as Sisben-1), the indi-
vidual’s monthly wage has to be very low. Otherwise, he would be excluded 
from social protection programs. As mentioned in Familias en Accion’s most 
recent operative manual, one of the employment status criteria to determine 
the access to the program is “to have an inadequate job8 or the lack of salary”.
By design, βi [0, ]∈ ∞  because some individuals might value benefits more 
than their costs. Thus, we want to estimate whether receiving a Familias en 
Accion grant may increase βi (worker’s valuation of social programs). This 
would lead to an increase in the worker’ utility that will unintentionally direct 
8 An inadequate job is defined as the presence of at least one person in the household 
who is working but is not enrolled in social security.
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him/her to valuate informality more by retaining the characteristics that make 
him/her a social protection beneficiary (such as a low registered income).
Considering previous evidence of social programs’ effects on labor force 
outcomes, Aterido, Hallward-Driemeir and Pages (2011) estimated that the 
expansion of the Seguro Popular program, which provided health insurance 
to Mexicans without social security, had an effect of a 0.7 pp reduction of the 
probability of being formally employed at the household level. At the firm 
level for the Seguro Popular program, Bosch and Campos-Vazquez (2010) 
found negative effects of between 3.8 pp and 4.3 pp in the creation of small 
and medium-sized formal jobs. They also found a reallocation of formal 
workers into informality.
Azuara and Marinescu (2013) used linear probability models with mu-
nicipality fixed effects. They found no effect for the Seguro Popular over 
informality when analyzing the overall population, but they did find a sta-
tistically significant effect of a 0.9 pp increase in informality for less educated 
workers (9 years of education or less). They did not find any effects for Seguro 
Popular on the transitions between formal and informal jobs.
Specifically, for Colombia, Camacho et al. (2013) estimated the effects of 
the expansion of social programs in the early 1990s by the government on 
informality measured as employees between 12 and 65 years old who do 
not contribute to health insurance through employment. They found a 4 pp 
increase in informality once the health reform was imposed.
Santa Maria, Garcia and Mujica (2008) estimated a 14 pp increase in non-
wage costs as a result of the 1993 social security reform in Colombia. They 
concluded that this increase in non-wage costs raised labor market segmen-
tation and, as a consequence, informality.
In a similar way, Calderon-Mejia and Marinescu (2011) analyzed the im-
pacts of Colombian unification of health and pension systems on informa-
lity, defined as workers covered by neither the contributive health insurance 
system nor the pension system. They found an increase in informality of 1.74 
pp only over independent workers. They also analyzed the effect by firm size 
and for small firms (2-5 employees), and estimated an increase of 2.5 pp in 
full informality.
More recently, Barrientos and Villa (2015) estimated the labor force par-
ticipation effects of the Familias en Accion program using a discontinuous 
regression design. They found significant effects only when sample restrictions 
on household composition and gender were applied. They found a statistically 
significant intention-to-treat effect on the probability of formal employment 
(employment with health insurance) among women of 3.2 pp for adults over 
21 years. However, for men, they found no statistically significant effect.
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As seen from these studies, the evidence is mixed, and the magnitude 
of the effect depends on the segment of the analyzed population. For this 
 reason, we decide to include three different perspectives that account for 
the most common definitions of informality used in the literature. Addition-
ally, through our empirical strategy, we intend to control for the differences 
between individuals that might affect the results.
3. Data
To apply our theoretical framework, we use data from the Familias en Accion 
program. We selected this database because its structure allows us to confi-
dently apply quasi-experimental techniques. Moreover, there is no similar 
dataset for any social program in Colombia with the magnitude of Familias 
en Accion.9
In general terms, the Familias en Accion database includes information 
from three different surveys: a baseline dataset collected in 2002, an initial 
follow-up completed in 2003, and a second follow up conducted between 
2005 and 2006. This information is publicly available and can be disaggre-
gated by household and individual. To compare the impact of Familias en 
Accion over time, we constructed two subsamples. The first one matches 
the baseline survey to the first follow-up, and the second one combines the 
baseline survey with the second follow-up. These subsamples allow us to 
explain the evolution of informality given social protection in the short and 
medium/long run.
Due to the labor market characteristics provided in the survey, we define 
workers as those who reported spending most of their time working the week 
prior to the survey or reported having a job. Additionally, to exclude child 
labor, only workers aged fifteen years and over were considered (according 
to Colombian Law 515 of 1999).
With respect to data collection issues, some municipalities received Fa-
milias en Accion payments before the baseline survey was conducted, thus 
causing data contamination. Therefore, we used only information from mu-
nicipalities where the baseline survey was applied before the Familias en Ac-
cion cash transfers were given. Additionally, in the second follow-up survey, 
some families that belonged to the control group started receiving Familias 
en Accion subsidies. These families were not included in the estimations 
9 Familias en Accion was the first large-scale evaluation of a social intervention 
implemented in Colombia (Briceño, Cuesta & Attanasio, 2011).
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 because their transition from the control to the treatment group distorted the 
characterizations of each group during the estimation process.
Regarding our perspectives to analyze informality, we created our infor-
mality variables as follows:
Informality 1 – Social protection perspective (Informality-1): This includes 
workers who were not enrolled in social security by the hiring firm. How-
ever, as previous evidence notes, the effect that social security programs have 
over small firms is higher (Calderon-Mejia & Marinescu, 2011; Santa Maria et 
al., 2008). For that reason, only for this definition, we focus only on workers 
who are not enrolled in social security and work in small firms (fewer than 
five employees).
Informality 2 – Productivity perspective (Informality-2): This includes non-
salaried workers who were unskilled. We followed Gasparini and Tornarolli 
(2007) to define informality by including non-salaried workers’ skills in our 
conceptualization. Due to data constraints, we used non-salaried workers’ 
education levels as a proxy.10 Since the target population of Familias en Accion 
are Sisben-1 families, poor people with low education levels and economic 
limitations, we considered as “unskilled” those non-salaried workers who 
had not completed high school. Non-salaried workers can be identified as 
independent workers, farm bosses or day laborers.
Informality 3 – Subsidized health system perspective (Informality-3): This 
includes workers who were enrolled in the subsidized health system. To ac-
count for Colombia’s particular characteristics in our conceptualization we 
decided to use enrollment in the subsidized health system as the criterion to 
analyze informality. If a worker is enrolled in this system, we assumed that 
he/she prefers to be informal and to continue receiving public health services 
for free rather than making any contributions to obtain similar private health 
services as a formal worker.
Our first subsample (baseline with the first follow-up) captures the effects 
of Familias en Accion in the short run. It includes 15,110 observations com-
posed by 5,918 treatment individuals and 9,192 control individuals. The aver-
age number of household members is 6, and the average numbers of children 
under 7 and children between 7 and 17 years are 1 and 2, respectively. Most 
of the individuals are men (approximately 58 %), and their average age is 37.
10 We decided to use a proxy because it would be almost impossible for us to properly 
measure workers’ skills (including hard and soft skills) based on the available data.
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Regarding informality perspectives, for Informality-1, there are 2,426 treat-
ment individuals and 6,766 control individuals. For Informality-2, there are 
2,175 treatment individuals and 7,017 control individuals. Finally, for Infor-
mality-3, there are 4,841 treatment individuals and 4,351 control individuals.
With respect to our subsample for the middle run (baseline with second 
follow-up), it contains 11,850 observations disaggregated into 6,180 treatment 
individuals and 5,670 control individuals. The average number of household 
members is 6, and the average numbers of children under 7 and children 
between 7 and 17 are 1 and 2, respectively. Most of the individuals are men 
(approximately 56 %), and their average age is 38.
Regarding informality types, for Informality-1 there are 1,148 treatment 
individuals and 4,185 control individuals. For Informality-2 there are 1,397 
treatment individuals and 4,276 control individuals. Finally, for Informality-3, 
there are 3,122 treatment individuals and 2,551 control individuals.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Causal Effects: Identification and Estimation
As mentioned earlier, we used quasi-experimental estimation techniques 
to evaluate the Familias en Accion program’s impact on informality in Co-
lombia. Thus, certain considerations (such as differences in covariate val-
ues between informal and non-informal workers) demand special attention 
during the evaluation procedure. Moreover, the non-random assignment of 
municipalities to the treatment (Familias en Accion beneficiaries) or control 
groups may lead to imbalances across the covariates.11 To avoid biased es-
timates of the impacts of informality in naïve comparisons of informal and 
non-informal workers, we applied propensity score matching to control for 
this confounding imbalance.
Through propensity score matching, we obtained the average treatment 
effect on the treated —att12—, which tells us whether workers who are Familias 
en Accion beneficiaries would have chosen being informal (binary outcome 
where 1 is being informal and 0 otherwise) and had they not  received  Familias 
11 Familias en Accion targets the poorest people (Sisben-1). Therefore, individuals 
self-select into the program.
12 We decided to use att instead of ate since, as Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) note, 
to estimate ate, we would have to construct the counterfactual of the treated, had they not 
been treated (as in att); and the counterfactual of the non-treated, had they been treated.
Fabiola Saavedra-Caballero, Mónica Ospina Londoño
Revista de Economía del Rosario. Vol. 21. No. 1. Enero-junio 2018. 81-120
93
en Accion assistance. Our counterfactuals were estimated13 by calculating 
each worker’s propensity to be informal using a representation of his his/
her decision through a logistic regression of the binary category treatment/
control and then matching these workers with workers with similar propensi-
ties. Every decision is based on a function of the individual’s observed char-
acteristics (covariates or confounders) summarized in a propensity score.14
As in a randomized experiment, the matching techniques balance covariate 
distributions between treated and non-treated individuals as an identification 
strategy.15 The treatment (T) is assigned independent of potential outcomes Y(i), 
where i=1 for informal workers and i=0 for non-informal workers. Therefore, 
we expect similar average outcomes if both groups receive the same treatment 
or if none of them do. This can be represented by the following equations:
E[Y(1)|T=1]=E[Y(1)|T=0]=E[Y(1)] (1)
E[Y(0)|T=1]=E[Y(0)|T=0]=E[Y(0)] (2)
These equations show that the average potential outcome for the treat-
ment group is equal to the average potential outcome of the control group, 
had it been treated (equation 1). The average potential outcome for the treated 
group, had it not been treated, is equal to the average potential outcome of 
the control group with no treatment (equation 2).
Based on this, the att is estimated using the following equation, where 
E[Y(0)|T=1] represents the counterfactual:
E[Y(1)-Y(0)|T=1]=E[Y(01)|T=1]-E[Y(0)|T=1] (3)
13 According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), it is not possible to know each indi-
vidual’s propensity because that would imply having complete information about selec-
tion. Therefore, these propensities have to be estimated.
14 By summarizing each individual’s characteristics, propensity score matching solves 
the “curse of dimensionality” that covariate matching would have because of continuous 
and/or numerous confounders.
15 The core framework that the propensity score matching method employs attempts 
to reproduce that of randomized experiments. Nevertheless, as Lee (2006) mentions, it 
is important to note two important differences between propensity score matching and 
randomized experiments. First, propensity score matching only balances the observables 
between treated and control samples, while randomized experiments balance the distri-
butions of both observables and unobservables. Second, the estimates from propensity 
score matching can be considered a weighted average of the estimates from many small 
randomized experiments.
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However, the estimation of the att would only be correct if the treatment 
were randomly assigned, thus making the outcomes independent. Unfor-
tunately, this was not the case for Familias en Accion, as the beneficiaries 
were selected based on specific characteristics. As a consequence, we use the 
 conditional independence assumption —cia— that ensures that the distribu-
tions of key covariates are balanced across the treatment and control groups.16
In addition to the proper selection of covariates for each equation, there 
are other latent issues that we must address, such as the effectiveness of our 
matching procedure and the reduction of bias. Therefore, we must focus on 
how well balanced our covariates are. As D’Agostino and Rubin (2000) note, 
the propensity scores only serve as devices to balance the observed distribu-
tion of covariates across treated and comparison groups. Thus, the success of 
the propensity score estimation is assessed on the basis of this balance rather 
than by the fit of the models used to create the estimated propensity score. 
Another aspect to consider is the assumption of common support.17 As noted 
above, psm estimation performs under this assumption, which implies that all 
individuals who lack a match or were poorly matched will be omitted from 
the att estimation. Therefore, we look for a sample with high levels of “on 
support” observations because the larger the sample from which the impact 
of Familias en Accion was estimated, the more relevant and representative 
the results are.
At this point, we have specified our identification strategy (propensity 
matching score). However, there are many matching metrics available to 
achieve our goals. The best matching metric is the one that provides the 
best balance across our covariates of interest. This is the “nearest neighbor” 
with replacement. This metric considers each treated unit and searches for a 
control unit with the closest propensity score. We used the variation in this 
metric that includes replacement, which means that an untreated (control) 
individual can be used more than once as a match for treated units.18 All our 
propensity score matching estimations were performed using Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003) Psmatch2 Stata module.
16 We have two main assumptions. 1) The set of characteristics we have chosen in-
cludes all relevant differences between the treatment and control groups. 2) The distribu-
tion of the characteristics in the control group we selected resembles the distribution of 
the treatment group.
17 All our matching estimations show a common support of 95 % and above.
18 By allowing for replacement in the nearest neighbor technique, we reduced bias 
and increased the average matching quality. Nevertheless, this also increased the variance 
of the att estimators.
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4.1.1. Difference-in-Differences and Matching
We combined propensity score matching —psm— with double-difference 
or difference-in-differences estimation —DiD— to address the potential for 
 unobserved heterogeneity, since the DiD method allows the program selec-
tion to be based on unobserved variables.19 As Khandker, Koolwal and Samad 
(2010) note, by jointly applying these techniques, we can address the nonran-
dom program placement that might bias the program’s effect while getting a 
better match control and projecting units on preprogrammed characteristics.
This estimator (DiD) compares a before-after estimation of treated indi-
viduals with a before-after estimation of non-treated individuals. This means 
(as mentioned by Bryson, Dorsett & Purdon, 2002) that the DiD estimator can 
cope with macroeconomic changes or changes in the lifecycle socio-economic 
status, as long as those changes affect both participants and non-participants 
similarly.
The equation for the DiD estimator is as follows:
β β β β ε= + + + +Y T P T P( * )it i t it1 2 3 4 (4)
where Y represents the outcome. T is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if 
the observation is in the treatment group or 0 if it is in the control group. P 
represents a post-treatment dummy that takes the value of 1 if the data are 
from a follow-up or 0 if the data correspond to the baseline.
4.2. Estimation and Results
As mentioned above, we performed all estimations using two different data 
subsets. The first subset includes information from the baseline and the initial 
follow-up, and the second includes information from the baseline and the 
second follow-up. Therefore, all results are presented for both data subsets 
in parallel. Initially, we present a naïve comparison between the treatment 
and control groups as a reference for further propensity score matching and 
DiD estimations.
To estimate this naïve difference-in-differences estimator, we used the 
following equation, which was originally proposed by Ñopo, Robles and 
Saavedra (2002) and modified for our purposes:
19 Nevertheless, the DiD method requires that unobserved variables be time-invariant.
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The impact that Familias en Accion obtained as a result of equation 5 for 
each type of informality are reported in table 1.
 Table 1. Naïve DiD estimator
InformalityPerspective Short Run Medium/Long Run
Inf.1 - Social Protection
 - 0.0036  
(0.0061)
 - 0.0057  
(0.0064)
Inf. 2 - Productivity
- 0.0062  
(0.0066)
 0.0266 ***  
(0.0076)
Inf. 3 - Subsidized Health
 - 0.0373 ***  
(0.0082)
 0.0079  
(0.0092)
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant: *10 %; ** 5 %; *** 1 %.
 Source: Author's calculations using Familias en Accion household survey data
As observed in the table, most of the coefficients are not statistically 
significant, which makes them unsuitable for analysis. However, there are 
two statistically significant coefficients that can be examined. From these 
results, we can infer that, in the short run, Familias en Accion might reduce 
the probability to be informal type 3 (being enrolled in the subsidized health 
system) by 3.7 percentage points and, in the medium/long run, increase the 
probability to be informal type 2 (being a non-salaried low skill worker) by 
2.7 percentage points.
Clearly, these naïve comparisons and estimators do not include features 
of each informality perspective, nor do they use comparable individuals. 
Therefore, to make this information truly comparable, we applied the pro-
pensity score matching technique and difference-in differences estimation as 
robust estimators, which allowed us to estimate the impacts of the Familias 
en Accion program over comparable individuals.
Initially, for psm, we applied the nearest-neighbor metric with replace-
ment and included Cochrane and Rubin (1973) caliper matching. This helped 
us define a tolerance level when comparing propensity scores (we set the 
caliper tolerance at 0.01).20 The psm results obtained are reported in the 
20 An issue with caliper matching is the difficulty in setting the tolerance level a 
priori (Smith & Todd, 2005). Therefore, we performed several estimations with different 
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upper section of Table 2. Additionally, these psm results can be used as input 
for a DiD estimation process that will provide our estimators with additional 
information that could be interpreted more confidently with respect to the 
effects of Familias en Accion over informality.
As Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) suggest, we performed a DiD 
estimation that includes psm specifications and results. As the effectiveness 
of the DiD estimator essentially depends on the characteristics of unob-
served variables that could affect informality, the DiD estimation is per-
formed only over the “on support” part of the sample after the psm procedure. 
The lower section of table 2 presents the estimates of the impact using the 
DiD technique.
Table 2. Estimation Results
Informality 1 - Social 
Protection
Informality 2 -  
Productivity
Informality 3 -  
Subsidized Health
Short Run Medium/Long Run Short Run
Medium/




Total Observations 15,110 11,850 15,110 11,850 15,110 11,850
On Common Support - 
Untreated
9,185 5,482 9,185 5,661 9,185 5,670
On Common Support - 
Treated
5,918 5,879 5,918 6,179 5,918 6,174
On Common Support 
- Total
15,103 11,361 15,103 11,840 15,103 11,844
Coefficients       
Unmatched - Treated 0.1558 0.1369 0.1901 0.2301 0.5460 0.5494














att - Treated 0.1557 0.1369 0.1901 0.2301 0.5460 0.5497














caliper levels. Our results (balance and common support) were not particularly sensitive 
to these variations. Hence, we decided to set the caliper at 0.01, as is used in most impact 
evaluation studies.
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Informality 1 - Social 
Protection
Informality 2 -  
Productivity
Informality 3 -  
Subsidized Health
Short Run Medium/Long Run Short Run
Medium/
Long Run Short Run
Medium/
Long Run
Difference - in - Differences













































Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant: *10 %; ** 5 %; *** 1 %.
Source: Author's calculations using Familias en Accion household survey data
When analyzing the psm results, it can be seen that, in the short run, the 
Familias en Accion program’s impact on informality is negative for infor-
mality perspectives 2 (unskilled workers) and 3 (subsidiary health system 
beneficiaries). Thus, in the short run, being a beneficiary of the Familias en 
Accion program reduces the probability of being a non-salaried unskilled 
worker and reduces the probability of being enrolled in the subsidiary health 
system while working.
However, in the medium/long run, we obtained positive results from 
the att estimations for all informality perspectives. There is an increase of 
1.54 pp in the probability of being a worker from a small firm who is not 
enrolled in the social security system. There is also an increase of 2.18 pp in 
the probability of being a non-salaried unskilled worker and an increase of 
1.93 pp in the probability of being a worker who is enrolled in the Subsidiary 
Health System.
The complementary estimations that include different tolerance levels 
are presented in Appendix 2. They provide evidence of robustness because 
the results are not seriously affected despite different calipers. Similarly, 
in Appendix 3, we present the results obtained with different algorithms 
(such as Radius Matching and Kernel Matching), with the aim of showing 
that the nearest neighbor algorithm presented the best balance and that the 
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 specification was statistically significant for all cases. Finally, in Appendix 4, 
we present heterogeneity tests for each equation.21
The findings presented in table 2 using psm could be broadly interpreted 
as the Familias en Accion program encouraging informality when workers 
make their labor decisions in the medium/long run. However, psm results 
can be used as an input for a DiD estimation process, which will provide us 
with estimators that contain additional information and could be interpreted 
more confidently regarding the effects of Familias en Accion over informality.
Our DiD results show an opposite effect than the one obtained through 
the psm technique for Informality-1 (social security informality) in the short 
run. While the psm shows an increase of this type of informality in both the 
short and medium/long runs, DiD shows a decrease of 3.73 pp in the short 
run and an insignificant effect in the medium/long run. This could be inter-
preted as a fading of the negative impact of Familias en Accion over workers 
not enrolled in social security (working in small firms) along time.
For informality-2 (non-salaried unskilled workers), there is a 2.76 pp in-
crease in the short run and 5.24 pp increase in the medium/long run. These 
results concur with the psm results for this type of informality in the medium/
long run, which estimated a 2.18 pp increase. This could be interpreted as 
workers making riskier decisions, such as being informal rather than loo-
king for a formal job. The Familias en Accion income could play the role of a 
financial safety net that allows unskilled individuals to start their own busi-
ness or to take jobs that are not regular but that pay more.
Informality-3 (workers enrolled in the subsidized health system) shows 
non-significant effects in the short run through the DiD technique. However, 
in the medium/long run, the Familias en Accion program has a positive 
effect on the probability of being enrolled in the Subsidized health system 
and concurrently working 7.13 pp. However, the magnitude of the effects 
measured through the psm and DiD differs for the Informality type 3 in the 
medium/long run. Both estimation techniques show an increase of this type 
of informality. This might occur because workers realize that, by keeping 
their Sisben status, they can have access to a subsidized health system and 
also to Familias en Accion benefits. Therefore, by being informal, they earn 
income working without making any contributions, have access to free health 
services, and receive cash subsidies from Familias en Accion.
21 As seen in Appendix 4, there is some evidence of heterogeneity in our estimations.
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Conclusions
This paper examines the effects of social protection programs on a broad 
definition of labor market informality. Social protection programs, such as 
conditional cash transfers, are known to be a powerful tool to combat in-
equality and increase welfare in a society. However, ccts may have also 
significant side effects.
Positive income shocks (such as ccts) may create perverse incentives for 
workers to move out of the labor market. First, due to ccts programs’ eligibil-
ity criteria (low income), individuals might want to keep their low registered 
income by working in a non-registered job (informal job). Further, ccts may 
act as a financial safety net that drives workers towards risky ventures, such 
as informality.
The social protection program “Familias en Accion” was developed as a 
social safety net for Colombia’s poorest people after the economic crisis the 
country suffered during the 1990s. The results that this program delivered to 
its target population (children and teenagers) were positive, such as increasing 
school enrollment, reducing childhood malnutrition and even discouraging 
child labor (Attanasio et al., 2006).
However, little has been said regarding its effects over different outcomes 
such as informality. That is why we examine the causal effect of social assistance 
programs on worker’s informality using the Familias en Accion database. To 
this end, we computed several matching algorithms and employed the near-
est neighbor propensity score matching with a caliper and a difference-in-
differences estimation for three different definitions of informality. We extend 
the existing literature on cct and informality by considering three different 
perspectives of informality. In addition, we exploit several key features of 
our dataset to examine the short and medium/long run effects.
Overall, we found that Familias en Accion affected workers’ probability 
of not being enrolled in social security (defined as Informality-1) only in the 
short run, decreasing it by 3.73 pp. This could be interpreted as workers leav-
ing those jobs that did not enroll them in social security (small firms) as a first 
reaction once they receive Familias en Accion money. However, the effect in 
the medium/long run is insignificant, which can be interpreted as workers 
making decisions based on criteria not related to social security enrollment. 
This result is related to Barrientos and Villa (2015), who estimated the labor 
force participation effects of Familias en Accion and found a statistically 
significant intention-to-treat effect on the probability of formal employment 
(employment with health insurance) among women of 3.2 pp for adults over 
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21 years. Although we control our estimations by gender, we don´t estimate 
causal effects by gender.
Regarding non-salaried unskilled workers’ perspective (Informality-2), 
Familias en Accion fostered informality in the short and medium/long run. 
In the short run, the probability of being a non-salaried unskilled worker 
increased by 2.76 pp and almost doubled in the medium/long run (5.24 pp 
increase). This reflects workers making riskier decisions (such as starting 
their own businesses or looking for an informal job) that pay higher wages 
but is neither regular nor accomplished by labor laws. In this case, Familias 
en Accion would play the role of a financial back up or safety net.
Finally, regarding workers enrolled in the subsidized health system (In-
formality-3), Familias en Accion affected them only in the medium/long run 
by increasing the probability of being a worker enrolled in the subsidized 
health system by 7.13 pp. This could be interpreted as the awareness of work-
ers regarding the benefits of being informal (no contributions, free health 
services and extra money from Familias en Accion). The benefits from social 
protection programs are more valuable to individuals than benefits from for-
mal employment if they consider that public services compensate for formal 
employment benefits. For example, if subsidized and contributory health 
services are practically the same in Colombia, then individuals would rather 
not pay for contributory services (through wage discounts) because they will 
receive almost the same services for free in the subsidized health system.
These findings suggest that, in the short run, Familias en Accion has a 
significant positive effect on the propensity towards informality only over 
those workers who are less productive (low skills or unskilled). Regarding 
workers who lack social security, the effect of Familias en Accion disappears 
over time (insignificant in the medium/long run). We also found a signifi-
cant, highly positive impact for workers who are enrolled in the subsidized 
health system.
Overall, these results show that people who are working but non-salaried 
and receive cct benefits are prone to become informal, especially in the me-
dium/long run. Unskilled workers are the most sensitive to these benefits 
because they are affected immediately (short run) and the effect over them 
persists over time (medium/long run). This may occur because benefits from 
social protection programs are more valuable to individuals than benefits 
from formal employment, especially if workers are less productive (Unskilled 
workers have less information about Familias en Accion and the conditions 
for inclusion/exclusion from the program). Moreover, in Colombia, the so-
cial assistance beneficiary status is defined through the Sisben (System for 
Social Assistance and Informality: Examining the Link in Colombia
Revista de Economía del Rosario. Vol. 21. No. 1. Enero-junio 2018. 81-120
102
Identification and Selection of Social Spending Beneficiaries) that classifies 
individuals based on their living conditions.22 Because beneficiaries consti-
tute the poorest part of the population, income is one of the most important 
weights. This might induce beneficiaries from social assistance programs, in 
an attempt to retain their benefits, to have low registered income levels or to 
not register incomes at all, which may lead them to informality.23
Additionally, individuals may consider that public services compensate 
for formal employment benefits (subsidized and contributory health services 
are practically the same in Colombia). Therefore, we speculate that individu-
als perceive money from cct programs as a financial security net that allows 
them to incur in more dangerous but also more rentable ventures (because 
of tax and contribution evasion) such as informality.
Our results coincide with previous studies that analyzed the effects of 
being eligible of social programs in Colombia. While Camacho et al. (2013) 
found a 4 pp increase in informality for the subsidized health system, our 
estimations show a 7.13 pp increase in informality. Our estimations are higher 
than Camacho´s results, this is explained because we estimate effects for the 
poorest population of Colombia, while they cover the whole country.
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Appendix 1: List of Covariates and Covariate Balance
In order to verify if the covariates were balanced across treatment and control 
groups, we used the following criteria for balance:
Unbalance Level 3 (U3) Unbalance Level 2 (U2) Unbalance Level 1 (U1) Balanced (*)




Even though most of our covariates are balanced (‘covariates’ means are 
not significantly different across treatment and control groups), we identified 
some covariates with a U3 level of unbalance. In that case, we applied the rule 
of a thumb that states that a percentage of bias of less than 10 % is acceptable. 
None of our unbalanced covariates surpasses a 10 % bias.
 Baseline and First Follow-Up
Informality-1
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.58 0.59 -2.3 -0.75 0.453 *
Family_Base 6.6795 6.4001 10.3 -0.49 0.626 *
Unemp_Base 0.03346 0.02416 5.2 0.3 0.766 *
Age_Base 37.051 36.896 1.1 1.38 0.166 *
Urban_Base 0.46181 0.4537 1.6 15.84 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.5647 4.3619 9.7 1.9 0.058 U1
Married_Base 0.65461 0.68858 -7.2 0.42 0.678 *
Hh_Falone_~e 0.13822 0.12359 4.3 0.17 0.869 *
 Source: Author's calculations
Informality-2
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.58 0.59 -2.3 -0.75 0.453 *
Family_Base 6.6795 6.4001 10.3 -0.49 0.626 *
Unemp_Base 0.03346 0.02416 5.2 0.3 0.766 *
Age_Base 37.051 36.896 1.1 1.38 0.166 *
Urban_Base 0.46181 0.4537 1.6 15.84 0 U3
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Informality-2
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Wap_Base 4.5647 4.3619 9.7 1.9 0.058 U1
Married_Base 0.65461 0.68858 -7.2 0.42 0.678 *
Hh_Falone_~e 0.13822 0.12359 4.3 0.17 0.869 *
 Source: Author's calculations
Informality-3
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test p Value
Sex_Base 0.58 0.59 -2.3 -0.75 0.453 *
Family_Base 6.6795 6.4001 10.3 -0.49 0.626 *
Unemp_Base 0.03346 0.02416 5.2 0.3 0.766 *
Age_Base 37.051 36.896 1.1 1.38 0.166 *
Urban_Base 0.46181 0.4537 1.6 15.84 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.5647 4.3619 9.7 1.9 0.058 U1
Married_Base 0.65461 0.68858 -7.2 0.42 0.678 *
hh_Falone_~e 0.13822 0.12359 4.3 0.17 0.869 *
 Source: Author's calculations
 Baseline and Second Follow-Up
Informality-1 Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.56 0.56 -0.6 2.66 0.008 U3
Family_Base 6.6629 6.5213 5.4 -4.49 0 U3
Unemp_Base 0.03253 0.02611 3.8 -0.35 0.724 *
Age_Base 38.112 37.883 1.6 1.16 0.246 *
Urban_Base 0.49668 0.48638 2.1 9.8 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.4923 4.3642 6.2 -0.24 0.812 *
Married_Base 0.70934 0.73798 -6.3 -1.71 0.088 U1
Hh_Married~e 0.85499 0.87765 -6.3 -1.54 0.124 *
Chdeath_Base 0.00275 0.00178 1.9 -0.02 0.986 *
Agesq 1648 1614,9 2.7 1.35 0.178 *
Savings 19.793 19.872 -5.7 -1.23 0.218 *
 Source: Author's calculations
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Informality-2
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test p Value
Sex_Base 0.56 0.56 -0.6 2.66 0.008 U3
Family_Base 6.6629 6.5213 5.4 -4.49 0 U3
Unemp_Base 0.03253 0.02611 3,8 -0.35 0.724 *
Age_Base 38.112 37.883 1.6 1.16 0.246 *
Urban_Base 0,49668 0.48638 2.1 9.8 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.4923 4.3642 6.2 -0.24 0.812 *
Married_Base 0.70934 0.73798 -6.3 -1.71 0.088 U1
Hh_Married~e 0.85499 0.87765 -6.3 -1.54 0.124 *
Chdeath_Base 0.00275 0.00178 1.9 -0.02 0.986 *
Agesq 1,648 1,614.9 2.7 1.35 0.178 *
Savings 19.793 19.872 -57 -1.23 0.218 *
 Source: Author's calculations
Informality-3
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test p Value
Sex_Base 0.56 0.56 -0.4 2.29 0.022 U2
Family_Base 6.6537 6.5821 2.7 -3.66 0 U3
Unemp_Base 0.03256 0.02899 2.1 -0.49 0.628 *
Age_Base 38.115 37.852 1.9 0.6 0.55 *
Wap_Base 4.4903 4.3968 4.5 0.64 0.525 *
Savings 19.793 19.854 -4.4 0.21 0.831 *
I1 (age*female) 16.624 16.296 1.6 -1.92 0.055 U1
 Source: Author's calculations
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Appendix 2: Sensitivity to proximity (calipers)
Data subset: Baseline vs. First Follow-Up
Informality-1
Caliper 
0.001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.156006768 0.142768836 0.0132379 0.007911 1.67 sig.10 %
Inf1_First   1.3237932    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.58 0.59 -2.3 -0.61 0.539 *
Family_Base 6.6734 6.3968 10.2 -0.68 0.499 *
Unemp_Base 0.03333 0.0242 5.2 0.3 0.764 *
Age_Base 37.025 36.865 1.1 1.58 0.114 *
Urban_Base 0.46159 0.45347 1.6 15.94 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.5597 4.3597 9.5 1.85 0.064 U1
Married_Base 0.65448 0.68832 -7.1 0.57 0.571 *
Hh_Falone_~e 0.13824 0.12359 4.3 0.18 0.855 *
Source: Author's calculations
Caliper 
0.0001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.156798623 0.14215671 0.0146419 0.007946 1.84 Sig.10 %
Inf1_First   1.4641913    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.58 0.59 -2.4 -0.79 0.431 *
Family_Base 6.6482 6.3649 10.5 -0.29 0.774 *
Unemp_Base 0.03167 0.02238 5.2 0.4 0.693 *
Age_Base 37.033 36.871 1.1 0.81 0.417 *
Urban_Base 0.46454 0.45594 1.7 15.5 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.5602 4.3602 9.5 1.45 0.147 *
Married_Base 0.65921 0.69002 -6.5 0.53 0.596 *
Hh_falone_~e 0.13408 0.12003 4.1 0.37 0.712 *
Source: Author's calculations
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0.001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.190017 0.21327 -0.02325 0.008721 -2.67 sig.1 %
Inf2_First   -2.32535    
Mean   
Treated Control % bias t-test P Value
Sex_Base 0.58 0.59 -2.3 -0.61 0.539 *
Family_Base 6.6734 6.3968 10.2 -0,68 0.499 *
Unemp_Base 0.03333 0.0242 5.2 0.3 0.764 *
Age_Base 37.025 36.865 1.1 1.58 0.114 *
Urban_Base 0.46159 0.45347 1.6 15.94 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.5597 4.3597 9.5 1.85 0.064 U1
Married_Base 0.65448 0.68832 -7.1 0.57 0.571 *
Hh_Falone_~e 0.13824 0.12359 4.3 0.18 0.855 *
Source: Author's calculations
Caliper 
0.0001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat signif
att 0,190706 0,213728 -0,02302 0,008759 -2,63 sig.1%
inf2_first   -2,30226    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.58 0.59 -2.4 -0.79 0.431 *
Family_Base 6.6482 6.3649 10.5 -0.29 0.774 *
Unemp_Base 0.03167 0.02238 5.2 0.4 0.693 *
Age_Base 37.033 36.871 1.1 0.81 0.417 *
Urban_Base 0.46454 0.45594 1.7 15.5 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.5602 4.3602 9.5 1.45 0.147 *
Married_Base 0.65921 0.69002 -6.5 0.53 0.596 *
Hh_Falone_~e 0.13408 0.12003 4.1 0.37 0.712 *
Source: Author's calculations
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0.001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.546531 0.590766 -0.04423 0.010765 -4.11 Sig.1%
 inf3_first   -4.4235    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.58 0.59 -2.3 -0.61 0.539 *
Family_Base 6.6734 6.3968 10.2 -0.68 0.499 *
Unemp_Base 0.03333 0.0242 5.2 0.3 0.764 *
Age_Base 37.025 36.865 1.1 1.58 0.114 *
Urban_Base 0.46159 0.45347 1.6 15.94 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.5597 4.3597 9.5 1.85 0.064 U1
Married_Base 0.65448 0.68832 -7.1 0.57 0.571 *
Hh_Falone_~e 0.13824 0.12359 4.3 0.18 0.855 *
Source: Author's calculations
Caliper 
0.0001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.54716 0.592615 -0.04546 0.010805 -4.21 Sig. 1 %
 inf3_first   -4,54553    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.58 0.59 -2.4 -0.79 0.431 *
Family_Base 6.6482 6.3649 10.5 -0.29 0.774 *
Unemp_Base 0.03167 0.02238 5.2 0.4 0.693 *
Age_Base 37.033 36.871 1.1 0.81 0.417 *
Urban_Base 0.46454 0.45594 1.7 15.5 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.5602 4.3602 9.5 1.45 0.147 *
Married_Base 0.65921 0.69002 -6.5 0.53 0.596 *
Hh_Falone_~e 0.13408 0.12003 4.1 0.37 0.712 *
Source: Author's calculations
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Data subset: Baseline vs. Second Follow-Up
Informality-1
Caliper 
0.001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.137108551 0.121770924 0.0153376 0.008214 1.87 Sig. 10 %
Inf1_First   1.5337627    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test p Value
sex_base 0,56 0,56 -0,7 2,60 0,009 U3
family_base 6.6494 6.5011 5,6 -4,37 0 U3
unemp_base 0,03213 0,02602 3,6 -0,43 0,67 *
age_base 38.116 37.891 1,6 1,16 0,245 *
urban_base 0,49797 0,48748 2,1 9,74 0 U3
wap_base 4.4892 4.3569 6,4 -0,11 0,912 *
married_base 0,70923 0,73763 -6,2 -1,62 0,106 *
hh_married~e 0,85462 0,87749 -6,4 -1,53 0,127 *
chdeath_base 0,00276 0,00178 1,9 -0,02 0,985 *
agesq 1,6477 1,615.4 2,7 1,32 0,185 *
savings 19.796 19.872 -5,5 -1,23 0,219 *
Source: Author's calculations
Caliper 
0.0001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.139139309 0.121728334 0.017411 0.008242 2.11 Sig. 5 %
Inf1_First   1.7410976    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.57 0.57 -0.3 2.02 0.043 U2
Family_Base 6.5474 6.3918 5.9 -2.91 0.004 U3
Unemp_Base 0.02858 0.02336 3.1 0.19 0.851 *
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Caliper 
0.0001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
Age_Base 38.163 38.034 0.9 0.73 0.464 *
Urban_Base 0.5108 0.49997 2.2 7.99 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.461 4.3317 6.3 -0.27 0.786 *
Married_Base 0.71271 0.7389 -5.7 -0.98 0.326 *
Hh_Married~e 0.85389 0.87702 -6.5 -0.67 0.503 *
Chdeath_Base 0.00238 0.00187 1 -0.06 0.954 *
Agesq 1,648.8 1,625.3 1.9 0.97 0.332 *




0.001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.230083 0.208667 0.021416 0.009998 2.14 Sig. 5 %
Inf2_First   2.141608    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.56 0.56 -0.7 2.60 0.009 U3
Family_Base 6.6494 6.5011 5.6 -4.37 0 U3
Unemp_Base 0.03213 0.02602 3.6 -0.43 0.67 *
Age_Base 38.116 37.891 1.6 1.16 0.245 *
Urban_Base 0.49797 0.48748 2.1 9.74 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.4892 4.3569 6.4 -0.11 0.912 *
Married_Base 0.70923 0.73763 -6.2 -1.62 0.106 *
Hh_married~e 0.85462 0.87749 -6.4 -1.53 0.127 *
Chdeath_Base 0.00276 0.00178 1.9 -0.02 0.985 *
Agesq 1,647.7 1,615.4 2.7 1.32 0.185 *
Savings 19.796 19.872 -5.5 -1.23 0.219 *
Source: Author's calculations
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Caliper 
0.0001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.232182 0.208286 0.023896 0.01003 2.38 Sig. 5 %
 inf2_first   2.389646    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test P Value
Sex_Base 0.57 0.57 -0.3 2.02 0.043 U2
Family_Base 6.5474 6.3918 5.9 -2.91 0.004 U3
Unemp_Base 0.02858 0.02336 3.1 0.19 0.851 *
Age_Base 38.163 38.034 0.9 0.73 0.464 *
Urban_Base 0.5108 0.49997 2.2 7.99 0 U3
Wap_Base 4.461 4.3317 6.3 -0.27 0.786 *
Married_Base 0.71271 0.7389 -5.7 -0.98 0.326 *
Hh_Married~e 0.85389 0.87702 -6.5 -0.67 0.503 *
Chdeath_Base 0.00238 0.00187 1 -0.06 0.954 *
Agesq 1,6488 1,625.3 1.9 0.97 0.332 *




0.001 Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.549895 0.530862 0.019033 0.011404 1.67 Sig. 10 %
Inf3_First   1.903298    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test p Value
Sex_Base 0.56 0.56 -0.3 2.35 0.019 U2
Family_Base 6.646 6.5707 2.9 -3.55 0 U3
Unemp_Base 0.03229 0.02872 2.1 -0.44 0.657 *
Age_Base 38.092 37.867 1.6 0.5 0.618 *
Wap_Base 4.49 4.3937 4.7 0.67 0.506 *
Savings 19.796 19.856 -4.3 0.31 0.759 *
I1(age*female) 16.586 16.297 1.4 -2.03 0.043 U2
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Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Stat Signif
att 0.55253 0.531819 0.020712 0.011444 1.81 Sig. 10 %
Inf3_First   2,071159    
Mean   
Treated Control % Bias t-Test p Value
Sex_Base 0.56 0.57 -0.5 2.01 0.045 U2
Family_Base 6.5674 6.4912 2.9 -3.25 0.001 U3
Unemp_Base 0.02539 0.02205 2 1.09 0.277 *
Age_Base 37.971 37.822 1.1 0.5 0.62 *
Wap_Base 4.4612 4.3656 4.6 0.83 0.405 *
Savings 19.821 19.873 -3.7 -0.28 0.783 *
I1(age*female) 16.237 15.964 1.3 -1.76 0.078 U1
Source: Author's calculations
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Appendix 3: Matching algorithms
Data subset: Baseline vs. First Follow-Up
Informality-1
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support
Radius
Unmatched 0.1574 0.1600 -0.0026 0.0061 -0.4200
att 0.1573 0.1478 0.0094 0.0063 1.4800 99,9657
Kernel
Unmatched 0.1574 0.1600 -0.0026 0.0061 -0.4200
att 0.1573 0.1481 0.0091 0.0063 1.4500 99,9657
NNmatch
Inf1_First Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95 % Conf. Interval]
satt 0.0045 0.0082 0.5400 0.5890 -0.0117 0.0206
Source: Author's calculations (Statistically significant: *10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %)
Informality-2
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support
Radius
Unmatched 0.1877 0.1949 -0.0072 0.0066 -1.0900
att 0.1876 0.1898 -0.0022 0.0068 -0.3300 99.9828
Kernel
Unmatched 0.1877 0.1949 -0.0072 0.0066 -1.0900
att 0.1876 0.1900 -0.0024 0.0067 -0.3600 99.9828
NNmatch
Inf2_First Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95 % Conf. Interval]
satt -0.0100 0.0088 -1.1300 0.2570 -0.0272 0.0073
Source: Author's calculations (Statistically significant: *10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %)
Informality-3
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support
Radius
Unmatched 0.5445 0.5818 -0.0373 0.0083 -4.4900




Unmatched 0.5445 0.5818 -0.0373 0.0083 -4.4900




Inf3_First Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95 % Conf. Interval]
satt -0.0517 0.0111 -4.6600 0.0000 -0.0734 -0.0299
Source: Author's calculations (Statistically significant: *10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %)
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Data subset: Baseline vs. Second Follow-Up
Informality-1
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support
Radius
Unmatched 0.1385 0,1431 -0,0045 0,0064 -0,7000
att 0,1386 0,1344 0,0043 0,0067 0,6400 99,9508
Kernel
Unmatched 0,1385 0,1431 -0,0045 0,0064 -0,7000
att 0,1386 0,1354 0,0032 0,0066 0,4900 99,9672
NNmatch
inf1_second Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
satt 0.0084 0.0085 0.9900 0.3230 -0.0082 0.0250
Source: Author's calculations (Statistically significant: *10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %)
Informality-2
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support
Radius
Unmatched 0.2277 0.2026 0.0251 0.0076 3.3000
att 0.2276 0.2014 0.0262 0.0079 3.3300 99.9672***
Kernel
Unmatched 0.2277 0.2026 0.0251 0.0076 3.3000
att 0.2276 0.2015 0.0261 0.0078 3.3500 99.9672***
NNmatch
Inf2_Second Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95 % Conf. Interval]
satt .022981 .0100367 2.29 0.022 .0033093 .0426526
Source: Author's calculations (Statistically significant: *10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %)
Informality-3
Algorithm Sample Treatment Control Difference S.E. T-Stat Support
Radius
Unmatched 0.5483 0.5402 0.0081 0.0092 0.8800
att 0.5484 0.5320 0.0164 0.0096 1.7100 99.9179*
Kernel
Unmatched 0.5483 0.5402 0.0081 0.0092 0.8800
att 0.5483 0.5331 0.0152 0.0095 1.6000 99.9343
NNmatch
Inf3_Second Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95 % Conf. Interval]
satt .0180565 .012001 1.50 0.132 -.005465 .041578
Source: Author's calculations (Statistically significant: *10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %)
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